The Law of Wills as Construed by Illinois Courts by Springer, William L.
Volume 51 
Issue 4 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 51, 
1946-1947 
6-1-1947 
The Law of Wills as Construed by Illinois Courts 
William L. Springer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
William L. Springer, The Law of Wills as Construed by Illinois Courts, 51 DICK. L. REV. 229 (1947). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol51/iss4/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
THE LAW OF WILLS AS CONSTRUED BY ILLINOIS COURTS
By
HON. WILLIAM L. SPRINGER*
Some years ago a young lawyer was arguing a case before a circuit judge
in downstate Illinois as to whether or not a minor was obligated to support in-
digent relatives from his own estate. He started by reviewing the law from
early England, thru Colonial days, thru the Northwest Ordinance and finally the
law of Illinois.
After this had gone on for a couple of hours the judge looked down and
said rather caustically, "I beg your pardon, sir, but have you read the case in
point on this matter in the latest advance sheets?"
The young lawyer looked rather startled and said, "Your honor, I've read
and reread on this case for the past five weeks and only got down to 98 Illinois
a few days ago."
The judge replied, "Then, young man, you started at the wrong end."
In many ways a review of the history and decisions of the construction of
wills in Illinois has shown to the writer that a beginning with the endwould have
some merit.' The remedies to be pointed out later in this article could be a
proper beginning. Like the latest "who-done-it" a start could be had from the
corpse, with a flash back to the beginning, and a gradually unravelling of the
mysteries of the succession of property in Illinois. The most complicated "who-
done-it" can have nothing on some phases of the history of the construction
of wills and many a deceased probably rests easier in not knowing what his off-
spring will have to do to secure his inheritance if his forbearer slipped a notch
on the execution of his will or put too many "wherefors" instead of not enough
"so thats."
The writer has no desire to be facetious-no more than is necessary to liven
up an issue which due to its early origin has become moss covered with both de-
cision and dicta. There is no more fascinating story of human nature than the
!ong history of the law of wills, nor any more perfect example of the tenacious-
ness with which men and courts have guarded the succession of property. And
even the eagerness with which twentieth century embryo lawyers approach the
'.LL. B., University of Illinois; Member of the Illinois Bar; State's Attorney of Champaign
County 1940-42; During World War II, Legal Aide to the Commander, Guantanamo Sector,
Caribbean Sea Frontier; Since December 1946 County Judge of Champaign County; Member
of American Judicature Society, Legislative Planning Committee of the County and Probate
Judges Association of Illinois.
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problem of inheritance is one of the marvels of law. In such a law practice do
all of them see the fortune and stability of the successful counsellor and attorney.
Few of them realize the catacombs of doubt into which they are being thrown
by the intricate decisions handed down by courts jealous of their prerogatives in
the handling of inheritances. With such a thought in mind and knowing the
suspicion which would be thrown upon a lawyer suggesting a- decision before
briefing the law, we reverse our field and lay before the reader a chronological
story of the background of the construction of wills in Illinois. In the end per-
haps the reader may agree that the remedies later set out are plausible as well
as acceptable under a judicial system such as is found in Illinois.
INTRODUCTION
The history of wills and testaments is as old as the law of inheritable pro-
perty. Wills were known to the English law previous to the Norman Conquest.
The introduction of military tenures limited the power of disposition so that no
estate in lands greater than for a term of years could be devised. But the ec-
clesiastical courts invented uses which were devised freely, and chancery com-
pelled their execution. Thus litigation in reference to wills early became the
subject of equity jurisdiction. When the Statute of Uses annexed the possession
to the use and executed it, the uses became no longer devisable and the statute
of 32 Henry VIII gave a limited power of disposition of real property by will,la
a striking incident in the struggle to secure the alienability of real property. Long
before a limited power of disposition over personalty had been secured by magna
charta.2 Notwithstanding :the great antiquity of wills and testaments, strangely
enough they are entirely the creatures of statutory enactment.3
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
The development of the law of wills and testaments has been largely marked
out by litigation involving the construction of the will. No branch of the law
presents greater difficulty in fixing definite rules to lead to correct conclusions.'
Long ago Lord Coke declared,
'wills and the construction of them do more perplex a man
than any other learning and to make a certain construction of
them exceed the art of jurisprudence." 5
Limited jurisdiction is conferred by statute to construe wills affecting realty in a
direct proceeding where equitable rights are involved,6 but the power should
Ja2 Blackstone Com. 372, 373.
24 Blackstone Com. 422.
32 Blackstone Com. 13; Storrs vs. Hospital (1900) 180 11. 368; There the term "will" as used
in sec. 10 of chap. 39 (1939) of our statutes had-the usual legal significance of that term,
and meant, not written paper but the-intention of will of the testator aslexpressed in the in-
strument. Peet vs. Peet (1907) 229 Ill. 346; 1 Redfield on Wills 3rd Ed. Chap. 2 Sec. 1.4
Jones and Cunningham Practice 4th Ed. Sec. 1234.
bRoberts vs. Roberts 2 Bulst 130.
6Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. (1923) Chap. 22 Sec. 5.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
not be exercised where nothing but legal titles are involved7 or where the will
is neither ambiguous nor uncertain and there is no equitable estate to be pro-
tected or equitable right to be enforced.
8
The difficulties in the problem are largely due to the fact that the con-
struction of a will arises indirecly, as in a bill for partition, 9 creditors bill, 10 bill
for direction in the execution of a trust," report of trustees,"2 bill to quiet
title,13 final report of executor, 14 suit to compel specific performance of the sale
of realty,'" or similar situations affecting the enjoyment or disposition of the
property devised. Apart from the construction of wills within the peculiar
province of equity, because of the subject matter involved or historical reasons,
a court of law has as much jurisdiction as equity. Save only the limited juris-
diction arising from definite statutory enactment the jurisdiction to construe a
will arises only when necessary to sustain a cause of action or defense.16 Con-
struction then in the law of wills involves the ascertaining and determining the
testator's intention as expressed in the will and its application to existing facts
and circumstances with which such intention deals.' 7 Cases involving the con-
struction of wills are thus found in every compartment of the law of property
with the result, as one writer remarks,
"the necessary liberality of the law in construing wills has.
opened the flood gates of legal chaos."' 8
The problem of construction is not peculiar to the modern practice. Black-
stone treats it at length." Lord Kenyon discusses the difficulty and mentions
the case of Sir J. Bland, who added at the close of his will that he had disposed
of his estate in so clear a manner that it was impossible for any lawyer to doubt
about it, yet when a contest of this will later came before Lord Hardwicke, he
remarked that he was utterly at a loss to conjecture the intention of the testator
and "wished he could find some ground on which to found a conjecture."20
7
Miller vs. Rowan (1911) 256 III. 296.
tICarlberg vs. State Savings Bank (1924) 312 I11. 181; Buckner vs. Carr (1922) 302 II1. 378.
9Downing vs. Grigsby (1912) 251 I11. 568; Cassem vs. Prindle'(1913) 258 I11. 11.
10Linn vs. Dowling (1905) 216 I11. 40.
llNorthern Trust Co. vs. Wheaton (1911) 249 III. 606; Hitchcock vs. Board of Home Missions
(1913) 259 Ill. 288.
12Jordan vs. Jordan (1916) 274 I11. 251.
131f by claimant in possession of improved property or out of possession of unimproved or un-
occupied property. Chapman vs. Cheney ( ) 191 I11. 574; Parson vs. Miller ( ) 189
111. 107; but see Mansfield vs. Mansfield ( ) 203 Il1. 92; Remainderman may file bill
while life tenant is in possession. 32 Cyc. 1337 (1906); Ewing vs. Barnes ( ) 156
I11. 61; Strawbridge vs. Strawbridge ( ) 220 I11. 61.
14Teator vs. Salander (1922) 305 I11. 17; Hudnall vs. Ham (1898) 172 I11. 76.
1'Ashby vs. McKinlock (1915) 271 11. 254.
16 Equity Jurisdiction to Construe Wills 6 II1. Law Rev. 486.
17Page Wills Sec. 457; Phayer vs. Kennedy (1897) 169 Ill. 360.
18Horner Estates Sec. 100, quoting O'Hara on Construction of Wills 27.
192 Blackstone Com. 378, 490.
20Small vs. Allen 8 T.R. 497.
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The approach of the problem by English courts is best characterized by the
words of Blackstone,
"the construction must be favorable, and as near the minds
and apparent intents of the parties as the rules of law will
permit."
21
This policy has developed a system of construction which is predicated on giving
effect to technical words and rules of law and has evolved rules which down to
the present time are rather faithfully followed and render the problem a bit
simpler. Redfield cites some twenty-four that are followed when possible, as
helps toward reaching the intent of the testator. 22  Other branches of English
law have felt this influence so far as the construction of the will is concerned,
especially the law of evidence in such cases.
23
American courts for the most part, and particularly in Illinois regard the
intention of the testator as the "pole star" by which the courts must be guided
and directed. 24  Where an intention of the testator is apparent from inspection
of the entire will, and the consideration of relevant facts and circumstances all
rules must yield if the intent does not offend against public policy or some posi-
tive rule of law. 25 The court cannot guess the intention which the testator
would have expressed had he been definite,26 but will consider all the circum-
stances surrounding the testator to give effect to the intent expressed.2 7 Vesting
of estates is favored and in doubtful cases the first taker will be given a fee
simple.28 The law favors the heir and will give that construction which makes
the distribution conform as nearly as possible to the general rules of inheri-
tance. 29 All words and parts of the will is to be given effect if possible.3'
Greater latitude is allowed in the construction of a will than a deed. 2 There
is ever present a strong presumption that the testator intends to dispose of his
entire estate and not to die intestate as to any portion of his property.3 3  Such
are the important rules of policy considered by the Illinois courts. It is doubt-
212 Blackstone Com. 279.
2 Redfield Wills 4th Ed. Vol. Page 425 et seq.
2 3
See Wigam's famous seven propositions giving rules concerning admission of extrinsic evidence
in aid of interpretation of wills. Woerner Administration 3rd Ed. Sec. 421.2 4
Engelthaler vs. Engelthaler (1902) 196 Ill. 230; Williams vs. Williams (1901) 189 Ill. 500;
Gee vs. Gee (1903) 107 Ill. App. 317.
250'Hara vs. Johnson (1916) 273 Ill. 458; DesBoeuf vs. DesBoeuf (1916) 274 Ill. 594; Gravy
vs. Shinn (1920) 293 Il1. 573; Himmel vs. Himmel (1920) 294 Il1. 557.
Z6Schmidt vs. Schmidt (1920) 296 111. 570.
2
7
Bradford vs. Andrew (1923) 308 Ill. 458; Boyle vs. Moore (1921) 299 Ill. 571; Abraham vs.
Sanders (1916) 274 Il1. 453.2
$Romer vs. Romer (1921) 300 Il1. 355; Meins vs. Meins (1919) 288 Ill. 463; Wilce vs. Van
Aden (1911) 248 I11. 358.
29Smith vs. Garber (1918) 286 Ill. 67.
lOSmith vs. Dellitt (1911) 249 Ill. 113; Spatz vs. Paulos (1918) 285 Il. 82; Degrees vs. Brydon
(1916) 275 Il1. 530.
l1Heisen vs. Ellis (1910) 247 Il1. 418.
3
2
Tucker vs. Tucker (1923) 308 Ill. 371; Fairview lodge vs. Gaddis (1921) 296 Ill. 570.
3SWatts vs. Killam (1921) 300 Ill. 242; Walker vs. Walker (1918) 283 Ill. 11.
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ful if there is but one rule of construction, viz., to give effect to the intent of the
testator. Judicial construction is the process of applying natural methods in
finding and weighing evidence to discover the fact of intention.84
No branch of our law gives so little heed to precedents. Due to the fact
that the provisions of will are as varied as the inclination of different testators
and the further fact that the question of construction usually arises indirectly in
cases involving all branches of property law, the decision can only apply to the
facts and circumstances of the particular case. Precedents therefore have but
little weight.3 5  It must necessarily follow that the problem of construction
must be worked out from a consideration of general principles. The execution,
publication, probate, and interpretation of the will must all be considered in
the light of the rules of policy to determine the effect of a specific devise of
property in Illinois.
EARLY PROBATE COURTS
The probate of the will gives it validity. In the early law there was noth-
ing corresponding to probate of a will devising real property. When the testator
died leaving a valid will it immediately went into force without formality and
whenever a freehold was claimed the original will must be produced. It was
the evidence to sustain the right claimed when the question was raised in a
collateral proceeding. 36 Thus the validity of the will might be attacked any
number of times and the will might have numerous constructions in different
actions in different courts. So great was the jealousy of the common law with
regard to ecclesiastical jurisdiction that neither an exemplification under the
great seal nor the probate under the seal of the ecclesiastical court could be ad.
mitted as secondary evidence.
3 7
At ecclesiastical law testaments bequeathing personalty were required to
be probated after the death of the testator as prerequisite to their taking 'effect.3 9
No testamentary disposition affecting personalty could be established or disputed
in any but the ecclesiastical or manorial court.39 They were not courts of record
and their decrees were not conclusive as those of the common law courts.40 Due
to the fact that the tenure of the feudatory was no property in the true sense the
difference in the manner of treating the devise of realty and the bequest of
personalty was to be expected,43 and must be kept in mind if we are to under-
stand artificial distinctions which appear in the administration of estates even
34
Peet vs. Peet (1907) 229 I1. 346.
35Black vs. Jones (1914) 264 Ill. 458; O'Hara vs. Johnson (1916) 273 11. 458; Ward vs. Cav.
erly (1817) 276 I1. 416.
26 Page Wills Sec. 312.
37Adam Ejectment 290 4th Ed., citing Ash vs. Calvert 2 Champ. 387.
88Page Wills Sec. 312.
3 9
Woerner Administration 3rd Ed. Sec. 215.
40Ward vs. Vickers (1802) (N. C.) 2 Hayw. 164; 31 Y.L.J. 105, 106.
41Woerner Administration 3rd Ed. Sec. 13 et seq.
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at the present time. The executor of an estate must be an officer of the court
organized for the purpose of aiding and controlling administration. 42 The court
having jurisdiction over the administration of the testator's estate must secure
the disposition of the property as he would have done if living. The functions
of such a tribunal, it is evident, have a ministerial element added. Due in part
to this fact the development of these courts have shown a gradual but steady
separation from the common law. and chancery courts and have resulted at the
present time in a practical recognition of probate jurisdiction as a separate and
independent branch of the law achieving for itself a sphere sui generis, based
upon and determined to a large extent by its own inherent principles." In
England the probate act of 1857 expressly abolished the distinction between
wills and testaments and created a court of probate where the probate of both
was required. 44
ILLINOIS COURTS
The statute of 32 Henry XIII and succeeding English statutes were never
adopted in Illinois." The Ordinance of 1787 for the government of the North-
west territory provided for making wills until the governor and judges adopted
laws. 4" The Illinois legislature in 1829 enacted our first wills act. It provided
for disposition of afteracquired property,47 and applied both to real and personal
property alike. 48 In 1872 a new act was passed 49 made necessary by the passage
of the married woman's act of 1861. Probate of a will, under the territorial act
of 1807, was required to be made by a solemn oath or affirmation of two or more
credible witnesses, or by other legal proof before the clerk of the court of com-
mon pleas. Under the law of 1819 two witnesses were required to the will, who
should declare on oath or affirmation, that they were present, and saw the
testator sign the will, and in each others presence, and that the testator was of
sound mind and judgment. By the act of 1821 a court of probate was established
and vested with all the powers then possessed by the court of common pleas.s 0
The constitution of 1848 established county courts and provided that their juris-
diction should extend to all probate matters5' and the constitution of 187052
declared they should be courts of record and have original jurisdiction in all
matters of probate, settlement of estates, appointment of guardians and the set-
tlement of their accounts. This constitution also provided for the establishment
4 2
Woerner Administration 3rd Ed. Sec. 10.4
3Woerner 3rd Ed. Sec. 11.4 4Statutes 20 & 21 Victoria C. 77.4 5Horner Estates Sec. 39.4 6Ordinances N. W. Territory 1787. Par. 2.
47Willis vs. Watson (1843) 4 Scam. 66, Peters vs. Spillman (1857) 18 I1. 573.4 8Rev. Stat. 1829, 191.4 9Rev. Stat. 1874, 1101.
60Gerguson vs. Hunter (1845) 2 Gilman 657.5 lConst. 1848 Art. 5. Sec. 1.
52Const. 1870 Art. 6 Sec. 1.
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by the legislaturue of probate courts in certain counties, having original jurisdic-
tion over probate matters and the settlement of the estates of deceased persons.58
Their jurisdiction is not exclusive in all probate matters. 4 The statute more
particularly describes the powers of these courts.65
JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURTS
The authority to establish probate courts was exercised by the passage of the
act of 1877, under which the probate court of Cook County was first brought
into existence. The act provided that the probate court should have origianl
jurisdiction in all matters of probate, that the process, practice and pleading shall
be the same as those now provided or which may hereafter be enacted concerning
the administration of estates. 56 Prior to 1877 county courts were vested by law
with jurisdiction in all matters pertaining to guardians and the settlement of
the estate of deceased persons. The act of 187757 establishing probate courts in
certain counties transferred this jurisdiction to the probate courts, and all mat-
ters pending were transferred to such probate courts and they were given juris.
diction to complete all unfinished business in relation thereto, but the jurisdiction
was retained by county courts in counties where the probate court was not
established. 5
CONSTRUCTION OF THE COURT STATUTES
We consider now the jurisdiction of these courts as conferred by the various
statutes in the light of the construction placed on them by our supreme court.
It has been held that the legislature is without power to cut down the jurisdiction
conferred by the constitution. 59 The constitution embraces every species of juris-
diction ordinarily exercised by courts of probate. 60 Probate courts are of limited
jurisdiction but while acting within the scope of their authority it has been held
as in the case of the county courts also, that they are not exercising an inferior
jurisdiction, 61 but as to matters within their sphere they are courts of general
jurisdiction.62 Liberal intendments are given in construing the statutes when the
jurisdiction of these courts is considered in matters of guardianship. "All probate
5
3Const. 1170 Art. 6 Sec. 1.
6
4Sod vs. Moderwell (1882) 104 Il. 64.
65
Hurds Stat. Chap. 57 Par. 93.5 6
1n the matter of Storey (1887) 120 Il. 244.
571 Starr & Curtis Stat. 718.
5S8The people vs. Seelye (1892) 140 II1. 191.
59KIokke vs. Dodge (1882) 103 Il1. 137.
6OWinch vs. Tobin (1883) 107 I11. 212; Ure vs. Ure (1906) 223 I1. 464; Beatty vs. Ogg (1905)
214 I11. 34; Mo. Riv. Tel. Co. vs. Nat. Bank (1874) 74 I11. 217.61 People vs. Seelye (1892) 140 111. 191.
62 Ford vs. Ford (1905) 117 App. 502.
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matters" as used in the statute and the constitution are to be used in the broadest
and most general sense.
"The constitution does not undertake to define all the par-
ticular powers which the court may exercise. It marks out
their general jurisdiction, and if in the bestowal by the legis-
lature of any special power, there be not palpable incongruity
with the constitution, the legislative will may be deferred to.
We need not scan words with critical nicety, to see whether
in strict precision of language the legislative definition of
probate matters may have been accurate.0 3
Again, these words concerning administration matters,
"The legislature in a very marked manner has established a
policy to facilitate the speedy settlement of estates and the
prompt distribution of funds to creditors and distributees.
This has been repeatedly recognized by this court. Moreover
public policy demands that such construction to the law
should be given, if practicable, and such rules of procedure
established, as will most nearly effect a realization of the full
value of the estate of the decedent. In this respect the legis-
lative policy is again strikingly manifest in the many pro-
visions of law giving the court supervision of sales, requiring
publication and notice, permitting sales on credit, requiring
valuation, and like provisions."
64
In another case the supreme court said,
"the county court although of limited jurisdiction, is not
strictly speaking of inferior jurisdiction. It is a court of record
and has a general jurisdiction of unlimited extent over a
particular class of subjects; and when acting within that sphere
is as general as that of the circuit court. When therefore it
is adjudicating upon the administration of estates over which
it has general jurisdiction, as liberal intendments will be
granted in its favor as will be extended to the ciircuit courts;
and it is not necessary that all the facts and circumstances
which justify its action should appear affirmatively on the face
of the proceedings."6 5
In commenting upon this language in a later case it was said,
"Tt has been frequently approved and so far as we now recall
in the decisions of this court never questioned. Upon the faith
of its correctness property rights have been acquired which it
would be justly unjust to disturb." 6
63Winch vs. Tobin (1883) 107 Ill. 212.
64
Wheeler vs. Wheeler (1890) 134 Il1. 522.
65Propst vs. Meadow (1851) 13 II. 169; Callon vs. Jacksonville (1893) 147 Ill. 113. Homer
Estates Sec. 73.
COBostwick vs. Skinner (1875) 80 Il. 148; Pike vs. Chicago (1895) 155 Il1. 660; Housh vs.
People (1872) 66 I1. 178; Moffitt vs. Moffitt (1873) 69 1l1. 243; Von Ketler vs. Johnson
(1870) 57 111. 169; Fecht vs. Freeman (1912) 251 Il. 97; Saloman vs. Wincox (104 I1.
App. 277.)
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When however the legislature sought to confer on the probate court juris-
diction over testamentary trusts the liberal intendments were disregarded and
notwithstanding the incongruity of recognizing in Illinois the distinction be-
tween real and personal property resulting in English law because of the feuda-
tory, the court held the act unconstitutional though suggesting it would be other-
wise as to the county courts but for the fact that the legislature could not be
presumed to have intended to confer such jurisdiction on the county courts
alone. 67 The common law distinction between the courts of probate and the
courts of construction is maintained throughout the decisions in Illinois and all
liberal intendments vanish whenever it is sought to construe a will in a direct
proceeding in a probate or county court. These courts can sell real estate to pay
debts but not to pay legacies even though made a charge on the property by
express terms of the will. "
SPECIAL MATTERS
In view of the fact that provisions of wills are for the most part construed
in indirect proceedings it is helpful to consider specific cases. The equity of re-
demption of a deceased mortgagor or grantor may be sold by the probate court
to pay his debts. 69 The county court fixes the inheritance tax on a testate estate
including contingent interests. It seems however that the judge is performing
a ministerial duty rather than a judicial one and the determination is not an
adjudication of the rights under the will. 70 The court will require an accounting
of a surviving partner and preserve the property until such an accounting is
had.7 1 The widows award will be set off and provision made for its payment, 72
matters concerning dower will be settled,7' the table of heirship determined. 74
The probate court may compel discovery of assets belonging to the estate of the
deceased 75 or compel the executor to inventory76 and account and distribute,77
but is seems the court of probate has no power to render a judgment in favor of
heirs and devisees against the executor for failure to pay over the distributive
portion of their estate. 78 The court will determine whether gifts or grants were
67
Frackelton vs. Masters (1911) 249 I1. 30; People vs. Jobush (1911) 165 App. 540; In re es-
tate of Mortenson (1911) 248 Ill. 520.
682 Il. Law Bulletin 120.
69Kenley vs. Bryan (1884) 110 Ill. 652.
70Woerner Administration 3rd Ed. 329a; Volunteers of America vs. Pierce (1915) 267 Il1. 406.
71Smith Hurd Rev. Stat. Chap. 3 Sec. 87-90; Mettles vs. Warner (1911) 249 I1. 321; Andrews
vs. Stinson (1912) 254 Il1. 111.7
2Lynch vs. Hickey (1883) 13 Ill. App. 139.
7 3
Davenport vs. Farror (1834) 1 Scam. 314; Bennett vs. Bennett (1918) 282 Ill. 266.
74Sebree vs. Sebree (1920) 293 Ill. 228; Ford vs. Ford (1905) 117A. 503.
7
5
Martin vs. Martin (1897) 170 Il. 18; Dinsmoor vs. Bressler (1896) 164 I1. 212; Hicks vs.
Monaham (1918) 209 Ill. App. 516; Wade vs. Prichard (1873) 69 Il1. 280.
7
6
Coffey vs. Coffey (1899) 179 Il1. 283; Heinreich vs. Harrigan (1919) 288 I1. 170; Gulzow
vs. Filwock (1917) 205 App. 366; Brown vs. Kamrerer (1916) 276 I11. 69; Williams Ex-
ecutors 480.7
7Woerner Administration 3rd Ed. Sec. 502, 536, 274, 561.7
,
8
Piggott vs. Ramey (1834) 1 Scam. 145. 556.
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advancements,79 whether the executor has done his duty and if not will dis-
charge him.8 0 Courts of probate have exclusive jurisdiction over personalty
though practically none over the realty.8 1 It determines the title of legatees. 2
Where real estate is converted into personalty under the doctrine of equitable
conversion the probate court will treat it as personalty. 83 Questions arising in the
course of administration are determined to the practical exclusion of courts of
equity.84 The courts of probate will hear and determine proceedings by guar-
dians for the sale of real estate of their wards, will determine what writing or
writings constitutes the will,8 6 whether it was properly executed,87 what degree of
mental capacity is necessary and whether the testator possessed such capacity,88
whether spoilations have been fraudulently or innocently made in a will,8 3
whether a lost or destroyed will will be valid and what its terms were. 0
SALE OF REAL ESTATE TO PAY DEBTS
In Illinois realty is treated the same as personalty in the law of descent
in determining who the heirs are to be 9 but the real estate of which a person
dies seised descends directly to the heirs or devisees. 92 Section 101 of the Ad-
ministration Act, passed in 1887, 9 3 confers jurisdiction on the probate court to
do whatever is necessary to effectuate the sale of real estate to pay debts. Pre-
viously it could only act on the title or claim to the estate as it found it and
could only sell whatever title or claim which the deceased had. 94 Since the
statute the court may remove clouds and determine and dispose of adverse
claims95 so as to give the purchaser a clear title. The full extent of the juris-
diction thus conferred is hard to determine. Courts of equity had theretofore
authorized the mortgage of real estate to raise money to pay debts of deceased
persons, but it would seem that where the jurisdiction over the estates of de-
ceased persons is confided to the probate courts with power to determine ques-
tions of title and to make a sale thereof the power of courts of equity would
thereby be excluded, 96 unless some other matter of unusual nature brought the
7 9Marshal vs. Coleman (1900) 187 11. 556.
SOHeustis vs. Johnson (1876) 84 Ill. 61.
8
lFerguson vs. Hunter (1845) 2 Gilman 657.8
2Durham vs. Field (1888) 30 Il1. App. 122.8 3
Greenwood vs. Greenwood (1899) 178 Ill. 387.
S4Goodman vs. Kopperl (1897) 169 Ill. 136.
86
Schouler Executors Sec. 85; Lasier vs. Wright (1922) 304 Ill. 131.
S7 Coleman vs. Marshall (1914) 263 Il. 330.
S
8
Baddeley vs. Watkins (1920) 293 Ill. 294.
8 9Mather vs. Minard (1913) 260 Ill. 175.
9OMather vs. Minard supra.
9
1Smith Hurd Rev. Stat. Chap. 39-1.9 2
Emmerson vs. Merrit (1911) 249 Ill. 538.93
Smith Hurd Rev. Stat. Chap. 3-101.
O4Harding vs. LeMoyne (1885) 114 Il. 65.
95Hoyt vs. Northrup (1912) 256 Il1. 604; Schuttler vs. Quinlan (1914) 263 II. 637; Verdun
vs. Barr (1912) 253 Ill. 120.
9
6
Woerner Administration 3rd. Ed. Sec. 345.
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entire administration into the court of equity. A recent case indicates that the
jurisdiction thus conferred is somewhat limited to settling disputes as to title in
proceedings to sell real estate and that general chancery jurisdiction so as to settle
all questions that might arise in a chancery court was not confcrred by the act.9"
JURISDICTION OF EQUITY
The several circuit courts in this state have the same jurisdiction in chancery
which the court of chancery in England has except where its jurisdiction is
limited by express statute, or by necessary implication, as where some other
court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over the particular matter. The same
practice prevails as in the English courts except where changed by statute.98
The statute provides that after the probate of the will any person interested
may within nine months file a petition to contest the will 99 .There must first
be an order admitting the will to probate 00 and while the jurisdiction is
statutory the court may exercise the jurisdiction conferred by the statute. 101  The
statute does not deprive the chancery court of any equitable powers it had be-
fore.102 The grounds upon which the will may be contested are not restricted
and any ground which will invalidate the will if established may be the basis
of a contest. 103 Provision is also made to appeal to the circuit court if probate is
denied and the question of admitting the will to probate is there tried de novo.' 0 4
Here the proponent may introduce any evidence competent to establish the will
in chancery, 105 the proceedings however are of the same character as in the
probate court.' 0 6
An amendment to the chancery act in 1911107 provided that such courts
may hear and determine bills to construe wills notwithstanding no trusts or ques-
tion of trusts are involved therein. Previous to this time it was not proper to
exercise the power (though equity had always had such power) where no trusts
were involved. 108 If purely legal titles were involved equity would not assume
jurisdiction. 1 9 The amendment has been held to require some ambiguity or
9 
'Hannah vs. Mainshausen (1921) 299 Ill. 525.
"8 Mahar vs. O'Hara (1847) Gilman 426.
ooSmith Hurd Rev. Stat. Chap. 148-7.
10ODowling vs. Gilliland (1916) 275 Ill. 76.
101Stevens vs. Colison (1911) 249 Ill. 225.
10
2
Anderson vs. Anderson (1920) 293 Il1. 565.
lOlDowling vs. Gilliland supra.
l0 4Smith Hurd Rev. Stat. Chap. 148-13.
105Beck vs. Lash (1922) 303 Ill. 549; In re will of Simon (1914) 266 Ill. 304; Norton vs.
Goodwine (1924) 310 Ill. 490.
106Sebree vs. Sebree (1920) 293 Ill. 228; St. Mary's Home vs. Dodge (1913) 257 Ill. 519; Brit-
ton vs. Davis (1916) 273 Il. 31.
10 7Smith Hurd Rev. Stat. Chap. 22-50; See complete history of Illinois courts with reference to
the contest of wills in Dibble vs. Winter (1910) 247 Ill. 243.
lO8Wakefield vs. Wakefield (1912) 256 Ill. 296; Poll vs. Cash (1908) 234 1I. 53; Strawn vs.
Jacksonville Academy (1909) 240 I1. 111.
1094 Ill. Law Rev. 431; Struber vs. Belsey (1875) 79 11. 307.
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uncertainty in the will itself and if it does not exist in fact, jurisdiction cannot
be conferred by an averment in the bill that the will is ambiguous or uncer-
tain.11 0
Chancery has always taken jurisdiction where any trust matter was involved.
111
A bill will not lie to construe a will with reference to matters solely within
the jurisdiction of the probate court, 112 nor can a creditor of an estate maintain
a bill unless his claim has been allowed in the probate court and some special
reason exists why that court cannot afford complete relief." 2  Jurisdiction to
determine homestead rights lies wholly with courts of equity."
4
Wills are brought into equity and are given a definite construction in a
great many cases where the equity jurisdiction over the subject matter has been
established. There is perhaps but one exception to the power of equity courts
to exercise their usual jurisdiction. Judge Story says fraud in obtaining probate
of a will is the only exception to the concurrent jurisdiction of chancery powers,
although he finds it not easy to discern the grounds upon which this exception
stands in point of reason or principle, although it is clearly settled by authority."'
EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURTS
Much discussion is found in the cases concerning the equitable jurisdiction
of the county and probate courts, a consideration of which discloses some ap-
parent inconsistencies. On the one hand the court says,
"evidently the legislature has attempted to give general
chancery powers","
6
while in a later case,
"the chancery powers of the probate court are not extended
beyond the narrowest limits consistent with the statute."
On careful examination however the cases are reconciled for the most part if we
distinguish between the extent and the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the
probate courts. The extent or the sphere of the jurisdiction is fixed by the con-
stitution and the statutes."' Whenever within the scope of jurisdiction confided
''OMcCarty vs. McCarty (1916) 275 Il. 573.
'l'Fracketlton vs. Masters (1911) 249 Ill. 3.
ll2Kolb vs. Landes (1917) 277 Ill. 440; Lorenz vs. Miller (1915) 267 Il. 230.
"
8
3Goodman vs. Kipperl (1897) 169 Ill. 136.
l14Utes vs. Utes (1913) 260 Il1. 362.
11
5
Story Equity Jur. Sec. 440; Luther vs. Luther (1887) 122 Ill. 558; But see Phippipps vs. Ben-
field (1911) 249 Il1. 139, dictum,
"We are not prepared to say that a case might not arise upon proper averment
and proof, which would authorize a court of chancery to enter a decree enjoin-
ing a defendant from causing a will to be probated when its jurisdiction to enter
such decree was not challenged."
''
6
Clayton vs. Clayton (1911) 250 Ill. 433; See note 4 Ill. Law Quarterly 140.
11
8
Andrews vs. Stinson (1912) 254 Ill. ill.
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to probate courts the relief to be administered involves the application of equit-
able principles their powers are commensurate with the necessity demanding their
exercise whether legal or equitable in their nature. 119 All probate matters are
equitable in their nature but the jurisdiction conferred by the wills acts is
statutory.12 0 In matters of administration these courts have general and un-
limited jurisdiction and may exercise an equitable jurisdiction adapted to their
organization and modes of proceedure,121 and they may adopt the forms of
equitable proceedings.122 The proceeding under the statute by the testator to
sell lands to pay the debts of the testator is not a chancery proceeding but the
court proceeds as chancery. 12  Equitable relief is granted in the settlement of the
accounts of executors 12 4 in allowance of claims, 125 in compelling disclosure of
assets,126 and to enforce by summary process orders entered for the delivery
to the administration of property wrongfully withheld.' In fact the court has
and exercises equitable powers in all matters touching the administration of the
estate. 128  When engaged in settling guardian's accounts the probate court is
practically a court of equity.' 2l Under its equitable powers the probate court
may order that an insane surviving husband, for the best interest of his estate,
shall elect to renounce a provision in his wife's will made in lieu of dower, and
if the conservator of the insane person refuses so to elect the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem to make the election. 130
The county courts do not have equitable jurisdiction where third parties
are to be brought in, and copartnerships, or other complicated and conflicting
interests are to be adjusted' although they will supervise the settlement of the
partnership estate by the surviving partner."' If a testator in his will appoints
his executor to be a trustee it is as if different persons had been appointed to
each office. A court of equity cannot remove him from the executorship but if
the office of trustee is separate and independent from the office of executor, a
court of equity may remove him as trustee and leave him to act as executor, or
119Chapman vs. American Surety Co., (1913) 261 Ill. 594; Woerner Administration 3rd Ed.
Sec. 149.
120Smith Hurd Rev. Stat. Chap. 148-2; 21; Walker vs. Cook 294 11. 294.
121Guzow vs. Fillwock (1917) 205 Il1. App. 366.
1
2 2
Martin vs. Martin (1897) 170 11. 18; Sebree vs. Sebree (1920) 293 Ill. 228.
123Moline Water Bower and Manufacturing Co., vs. Webster (1861) 26 I1. 234; Akin vs. Akin
(1915) 268 Ill. 324.
12
4
Wadsworth vs. Connell (1882) 104 Ill. 370.
12
5
Dixon vs. Buell (1859) 21 Ill. 202; Schlink vs. Maxton (1894) 153 Ill. 447.
126Hicks vs. Monahan (1918) 09 Ill. App. 516; Kepple vs. Crabb (1909) 152 Ill. App. 149;
Martin vs. Martin (1897) 170 I1. 18.
127Hicks vs. Monahan, Supra.
128 Esmond vs. Esmond (1910) 154 Ill. App., 11 and case cited.
129Bond vs. Lockwood (1864) - Ill. 212; Klokke vs. Dodge (1882) 103 Ill. 35; People vs.
Seely (1922) 140 Ill. 191.
'3 ODavis vs. Mather (1923) 309 Il. 284.
1 81Pahlman vs. Graves (1861) 26 Ill. 406.
182 Smith Hurd Rev. Stat. Chap. 3-85-89.
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if he has completed his duties as executor and is holding the estate simply as
trustee, a court of equity may remove him."'
It thus appears that probate and county courts possess no original chancery
powers, yet within the scope of the jurisdiction conferred upon them, their powers
are confined neither to legal nor to equitable rules, but are to be measured by the
statutory grant alone.184
OVERLAPPING JURISDICTION
We have seen that the statutes define the limits of probate jurisdiction. It
must be remembered however that the separation of the probate jurisdiction
from the common law and chancery courts and its recognition as a distinct and
separate branch of the law has been a gradual development, which cannot be
fully understood apart from its historical distinctions.
Courts of equity have always been loathe to surrender a jurisdiction once
acquired. Pomeroy says it is admitted by the later as well as the earlier cases
in Illinois that equity retains a general jurisdiction over administrations, concur-
rent with, but paramount to that possessed by the probate courts, and the only
practical question is when will the jurisdiction be exercised. 18 5 The earlier de-
cisions allowed its exercise somewhat more freely than is done by the later ones.
They seem to have permitted a resort to equity in the first instance instead of to
the probate court for the purpose of accounting and final settlement, without
any special ground alleged, and also for the purpose of reexamining and cor-
recting a settlement made by the probate court with which a party was dissat-
isfied. The more recent cases while fully admitting the existence of this juris-
diction have repeatedly declared the rule to be that courts of equity will not
exercise jurisdiction over the administration of estates except in extraordinary
cases. Some special reason must be shown why the administration should be taken
from the probate court."8 6 Gross mismanagement of an estate by the executor,
both as to real and personal property, and a breach of trust as to the sale of the
real estate are grounds for equitable interference at the instance of creditors
whose rights have been prejudiced by the misconduct."37 The county court in the
exercise of its equitable jurisdiction may grant equitable relief in many cases
and may adjudicate most of the questions arising during the administration.
But it has often been held in this state that courts of equity have a paramount
jurisdiction in cases of administration and settlement of estates. Courts of
chancery may in the exercise of their general jurisdiction take upon themselves
1
8
SWylie vs. Bushnell (1917) 277 111. 484.
1
8 4
McCall vs. Lee (1887) 120 Ill. 261.
1
8 6
Pomeroy Eq. Jur. Vol. 3, Sec. 3.
1
86
Goodman vs. Kopperl (1896) 67 Ill. App. 42; Shepard vs. Speer (1892) 140 Ill. 238; Strauss
vs. Phillipps (1901) 189 Il. 9.
18 'Elting vs. First National Bank (1898) 173 Ill. 368.
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the administration, and thus in the case of a particular estate, supersede the
jurisdiction of the probate court. Where they do this for any reason, they will
take the whole of the administration into their hands. 18 8 But equity will never
set aside the judgments of the probate court.18 9
Concurrent and cumulative remedies are not forbidden. A petition to set
aside the order probating the will does not abate on filing a bill in chancery to
set aside the probate. If the petition to set aside the probate fails then the case
begun by the filing of the bill in chancery may proceed. The proceeding in the
county court is to a large extent a proceeding in rem and has reference to the
execution of the will which is a matter for the determination of the court. The
proceeding in chancery tries an issue of fact and calls for the intervention of a
jury and partakes of the nature of a proceeding in personam.1'"
THE PROBATE OF THE WILL
A will takes its legal validity from its probate, that is, the certification by
the court clothed with authority for such purpose, that it has been executed, at-
tested, and published as required by law and that the testator was of sound and
disposing mind. Without such proof it is not a will in the legal sense."' At
common law without the consent of the probate court no other court can take notice
of the rights of representation to personal property, and that wills devising real
estate must be proved in the common law courts.
It is no part of the proceeding on probate to construe or interpret the will
or any of its provisions, or to distinguish between valid and void, rational and
impossible dispositions; if the will be properly executed and proven it must be
admitted to probate although it contain not a single provision capable of execu-
tion, or valid under the law. Hence the probate does not establish the validity or
effect of any of its provisions, this is to be determined by the courts of construc-
tion, when some question arises requiring their interposition. 142 The probate
is a judicial act establishing the validity of the will and its proper execution,' 48
the act of taking the proof and its execution was early held to be a ministerial and
not a judicial act.' 44 The proceeding is a trial or action at law.146 The statute
regulates the procedure.
146
138Elting vs. First National Bank, supra.
13
9
Jones & Cunningham Practice 4th Ed. Sec. 9.
140Wright vs. Simpson (1902) 200 Il. 63; Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, tst Ed. P. 549; McNulta
vs. Lockridge (1891) 137 Ill. 270; Simon Probate Practice, Sec. 132.
141Woerner Administration 3rd Ed. Sec. 213.
1
4 2
Woerner Administration 3rd Ed. Sec. 228.
14sSimpson vs. Anderson (1922) 305 Il. 172.
144 Gerguson vs. Hunter (1845) 2 Gilman 657.
1
45
Simpson vs. Simpson (1916) 273 Ill. 90.
l
4 6
Smith Hurd Rev. Stat. Chap. 148-21.
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There are two kinds of probate in the ecclesiastical law; probate "in the
common form" and probate "in the solemn form" or per testes. Probate in the
common form was an ex paite proceeding with notice to the next of kin, while
probate in the solemn form was a proceeding upon citation to all persons inter-
ested, and upon full proof by witnesses for and against the will. 1 7 Since the
Act of 1897 a proceeding to probate a will in Illinois is inter partes and notice
is required.118 Previous to 1909 the proceeding to probate a will had been in
the nature of a proceeding in rem 19 but the statute made the proceeding inter
partes and the method of acquiring jurisdiction is that the parties shall be given
notice. 16 0 It is not strictly an adversary proceeding however, as interested
parties, although notified and appearing have no right to introduce evidence
to defeat the will but must resort to a bill in chancery to do so, and there the
proponents of the will, notwithstanding the probate, still have the burden of
proving its execution and validity.151
JUDGMENTS OF THE PROBATE COURT
The constitutional provision of giving full faith and credit to judicial pro-
ceedings in other states includes proceedings in probate courts, and requires
that such be given the faith and credit which they have by law and usuage in the
courts of the state where the proceedings are held.162 It is well settled that the
probate of the will cannot be attacked in a collateral proceding, as a bill for
partition, 153 or a bill to construe a will,' 5 ' and is prima facie valid until it is set
aside. 156 The judgment allowing or disallowing the probate of any will is final
and conclusive unless reversed on appeal, but where probate is denied because
of the existence of a later will such judgment is not conclusive if the later will
is set aside.'6 6 The judgment however does not become conclusive so as to bar
a contest until the time given by statute for beginning such action has expired.'
5 7
On the appeal to the circuit court to set aside the order of probate the question
whether the order was properly entered on the showing made, or was based on evi-
dence that was incompetent or insufficient, or whether based on any evidence
whatever, is not a subject of inquiry.'6 8 The trial is de novo and the sole ques-
14"Page Wills Sec. 312.
148Walker vs. Cook (1920) 294 11. 294.14 9
1n the matter of Storey (1887) 120 II. 244.
15OMosser vs. Flake (1913) 258 Ill. 233.
151Pratt vs. Hawley (1921) 297 Ill. 244. Objection in the probate court to the probate or on
appeal from the probate court, must be confined to the formal execution of the will and
cannot include the issues of sanity and undue influence. The latter issues must be tried in
chancery. Clausenius vs. Clausenius (1899) 179 Il. 545.
152Pratt vs. Hawley (1921) 297 Il. 244.
153Wetmore vs. Henry (1913) 259 Il. 80.
154Slick vs. Brooks (1912) 253 Ill. 58.
l66Smith vs. Smith (1897) 168 II. 488.
15GAdams vs. First M. E. Church (1911) 251 Ill. 268.
157Smith Hurd Rev. Stat. Chap. 148-7; Dowling vs. Gilliland (1916) 275 Ill. 76.
168Hutchinson vs. Hutchinson (1911) 250 Ill. 170.
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tion is, as before, whether the instrument offered is in fact the will of the
testator, 159 and so a finding in a decree that a person died testate, even upon
proper proof showing probate of the will, it not res adjudicata in a subsequent
proceeding to contest the same,' 6 ' but it will be presumed that the judge of the
probate court performed his duty in all matters touching the probate.' 6' A
judgment denying probate without the proper appointment of a guardian ad
litem to represent minor devisees is not void since the judge may waive the ap.
pointment if it appears unnecessary to protect the interests of the minor.' 62
Where the court finds that the instrument offered for probate is the last will
and testament and admits it to probate the finding effects a revocation of a
former will previously probated, even though there was no formal revocation
of the first probate.163 This holding seems to limit the doctrine that the probate
cannot be collaterally attacked in its application to proceedings in the same
tribunal.
A court of chancery is competent to grant relief against judgments obtained
in the county court by fraud (except fraud in probating a will as noted supra) 164
and this whether the judgment be voidable or void. 165 So a judgment rendered
by a county court against an estate through the fraud and collusion of the execu-
tor and the party holding the alleged claim in the form of a void judgment of
a foreign state, may be set aside in equity at the instance of third parties whose
rights are prejudiced thereby.166 An order of the probate court finding the
heirship in an estate is, in an appeal to the circuit court from a subsequent order of
the probate court in that estate, prima facie evidence of the facts found, but it
may be contradicted in such appeal by evidence overcoming the presumption. 167
A non resident son was not estopped by a decree of the Illiinois court finding
his brother and sisters to be his heirs, from raising the question in another
proceeding. 168
Until an estate has been completely administered any previous order entered
therein may be directly attacked in the same court when application is made for
another order which involves a further step in the administration.169 An order
1
59
Smith Hurd Rev. Stat. Chap. 148-6, 7.
160Kelly vs. Kelly (1918) 285 I11. 72.
161Kersy vs. Lovell (1921) 299 111. 611.
162 Simpson vs. Simpson (1916) 273 Ill. 90.
163Speer vs, Josehans (1916) 274 II1. 237; Woerner Administration 3rd Ed. Sec. 204. Balsewicz
vs. R. R. Co., (1909) 240 I11. 238; An order appointing a special administrator to collect
without revoking the letters of a duly qualified and acting executor, is void, although under
Sec. 72 of the Administration act, an administrator pro tem may be appointed to defend,
without revoking letters, when the regular administrator or executor has filed a claim against
the estate. Day vs. Bullen (1907) 226 I11. 72.
1
64
Propst vs. Meadows (1831) 13 Ill. 157.
165Nelson vs. Rockwell (1853) 14 111. 175.
166Elting vs. First National Bank (1898) 173 Ill. 368.
167Ford vs. Ford (1905) 117 I11. App. 502.
168Mosier vs. Osborn (1918) 284 I11. 141; See criticism of this case in 32 Harvard Law Rev. 79.
169Ford vs. Ford (1905) 117 I11. App. 502.
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approving an executor's report and declaring the estate closed has the effect
only of closing the account up to the time the report is approved"t0 and is void
as to the unsettled portion of the estate' 7' and does not work a discharge of the
executor, nor settle the estate; 172 other assets may be realized and new liabilities
incurred involving a continuance of duty and responsibility. 173  The approval of
the report of the executor is a judicial act and when made and entered according
to law is conclusive on all parties before the court, 174 but if the order be made
without notice to those entitled thereto it is competent for the court to set it
aside at a subsequent term. 17 Wherein a party is cited to reach property in his
possession belonging to the estate 176 and denies the possession of the same, and
after trial is discharged by the court, such discharge will be a bar to any recovery
in another action in respect to the same property. 177 Irregular matters in the
proceedings and sale of real estate to pay debts, as issuing the deed before
the approval of the sale, which are cured by the order approving the sale, cannot
be raised to defeat titles of innocent purchasers in possession.' 78 The purchase
by an executor at the sale of real estate belonging to his testator is fraudulent
per se and creditors whose claims against the estate have been allowed may main-
tain a bill in equity to set the sale aside, nothwithstanding its approval by the
probate court.'
79
The law affords a large measure of protection to the executor or admin-
istrator while proceeding under the orders of the court. He is in the full sense
an officer of the court which is organized and has jurisdiction for the special
purpose of aiding and controlling him in the administration.' 80 Even though the
will and the proceedings thereunder be later set aside by due course of law and
the letters revoked, the acts of the executor after probate are valid never the
less.181 So where the discovery and probate of a will revokes letters of admin-
istration the various acts done and and performed under the first grant of letters
are binding until set aside in a direct proceeding. The court having jurisdiction
of the person and the subject matter, its act is not void in granting letters even
170Starr vs. Willoughby (1909) 218 II1. 485.
i'tMaguire vs. City of Mecomb (1920) 293 I11. 441.
172Atherson vs. Huges (1911) 249 I11. 317; Where a will directs an executor to sell land as
soon as possible after the testator's decease and distribute the proceeds, an order of the court
declaring the estate settled and discharging the executor, before he has sold the land does not
revoke his power to make the sale. Starr vs. Willoughby (1905) 218 I11. 485.
173Fraser vs. Fraser (1909) 149 App. 186.
174 Frank vs. People (1893) 147 Ill. 206.
175Long vs. Thompson (1871) 60 Il1. 27.
176Smith Hurd Rev. Stat. Chap. 148-90.
177Wade vs. Pritchard (1873) 69 Ill. 280.
17
8
Verdun vs. Barr (1912) 253 IlM. 120.
17OElting vs. First National Bank (1898) 173 Ill. 368.
iSOWoerner Administration 3rd Ed. Sec. 10.8 1 Smith vs. Smith (1897) 168 I1. 488.
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though it may have proceeded erroneously.18l Letters granted on one supposed
to be dead can be impeached collaterally by proof that the supposed decedent
is in fact alive.183
While county and probate courts are of limited jurisdiction they have under
the statutes in Illinois, the power within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred
upon them to enforce certain of their decrees and orders by chancery practice. 18'
Where a person refuses to comply with a proper order to disclose assets belong-
ing to the estate the court may commit such person to jail 18  and if an executor
fails or refuses to comply with an order requiring him to make payment the
remedy is by attachment for contempt.
186
APPEALS
The right of appeal from decisions of the probate court rests solely on
statutory provisions and unless these are complied with the right cannot be
available.' 87 Under the statute an appeal lies from any final order to the cir-
cuit courts where the matter shall be tried de novo. 188 Appeals in will cases
lie from the final orders of the circuit courts to the supreme or appellate courts
as in other matters.18 9 An appeal lies to the circuit court from an order of the
probate court setting aside a table of heirship, 1 0 for errors in ruling on evi-
dence,' 8 ' from dismissing without prejudice a petition to determine homestead
rights (the probate court never having jurisdiction of this matter), 19 2 from
allowing or refusing probate of a will. 193 In a proceeding to sell real estate to
pay debts where the controversy relates to controverted titles, the appeal lies
directly to the supreme court. Questions relating to a claim in any amount, or
concerning the removal of an administrator or executor on appeal go to the
circuit court. The same is true of all probate and administrative matters save
only the sale of real estate and those go on direct appeal to the appellate or
the supreme court "as in other civil cases in courts of record. '194
182Shephard vs. Rhodes (1871) 60 Ill. 301.
l
8
3Woerner Administration 3rd Ed. Sec. 211; Scott vs. McNeal (1893) 154 U. S. 34; Donovan
vs. Major (1912) 253 Ill. 179.1 84
Hicks vs. Monahan (1918) 209 I1. App. 516.
185Smith Hurd Rev. Stat. Chap. 3-81, 82.
186piggot vs. Ramey (1834) 1 Scam. 145.
1
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Woerner Administration 3rd Ed. Sec. 543.8 8
Smith Hurd Rev. Stat. Chap. 126; Wood vs. Johnson (1883) 13 Ill. App. 548.
18 gMorris vs. Morris (1882) 112 Il. 68.
190Sebree vs. Sebree (1920) 293 Il1. 228.
191Blair vs. Sennett (1890) 134 I1. 78.92 Utes vs. Utes (1913) 260 11. 362.
il9Quirk vs. Pierson (1919).
194Smith Hurd Rev. Stat. Chap. 3, Sec. 219 (1945).
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EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IN WILLS CASES
Whenever the problem of construction arises whether directly or indirectly
perplexing evidence questions arise. The Illinois cases present many conflicts
in this field. It has been remarked that the Illinois court is obliged to give effect
to every intention which the will if properly expounded, expresses. It follows
that evidence which in its nature and effect is simply explanatory of what the
testator has written may be admitted but none is admissable which in its nature
and effect is applicable to the purpose merely of showing what he intended to
have written. Illinois cases seem to have disregarded the distinction between a
latent and patent ambiguity and admit the light of extrinsic circumstance in both.
It is often said that a mistake in a will cannot be corrected. The cases establish
that no new matter can be brought into the will by parole evidence, upon which
the will is silent and this however apparent the intention of the testator may be.
Judge Homer emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between the in-
terpretation of the will and the reformation of the will. Mistakes are in fact
corrected by the former. Courts constantly construe ambiguous instruments. If
property has been misdescribed the court will strike out the erroneous descrip-
tion and if the will is then intelligible it will be interpreted by the court of
construction. Extrinsic evidence is never admissable to supply a word omitted
by the testator, or by the scrivenor, or to show that the word or phrase was
written into the will by mistake. No good reason appears why it should not
be permissable to introduce the same evidence for the purpose of reforming a
will to correct an obvious mistake as would be admitted in the case of an agree-
ment in writing touching any other matter. Especially is this true when we re-
member the particular anxiety of the courts to determine and follow the intent
of the testator. The lack of jurisdiction to reform mistakes in wills present mote
complexity and gives rise to greater confusion than any other single problem
of construction.
SUMMARY
The development of probate jurisdiction has been hindered by historical
influences which should have no influence in Illinois today. Our probate and
county courts have been given large jurisdiction in all probate matters except
wills, but in respect to them judicial construction, has cut down the limits of the
jurisdiction as marked out by the constitution and the statutes. The discussion
in the cases concerning the jurisdiction of the county and probate courts can
only be understood by relating much of it to the nature instead of the extent
thereof. The appeal to the circuit court with its trial de novo contributes to the
increase of litigation. The new trial on the question of probate of the will in
the circuit court delays administration. The liberal powers given these courts
in the matter of the sale of real estate to pay debts have been properly exer-
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cised and have made this part of administration the most satisfactory. The present
system does not give titles arising under a will the certainty the law seeks to
secure for them in other fields. Questions of construction for the most part
arise in indirect proceedings and frequently many years after the estate is settled.
The probate and the distribution of the property at the close of a proper admin-
istration should carry with it a determination of the questions which at some
later time will quite probably be litigated.
From a purely academic point of view our county and probate courts have
no power to construe a will, but as a practical matter in many cases they do
just this. Many final orders of these courts turn on the construction and interpreta-
tion of matters in the will, concerning powers of the executor, whether equitable
conversion was intended, etc., and if not appealed from these become final
orders. When the county court fixes the inheritance tax on a contingent interest
it matters little to the devisee who is to pay the tax whether the court has per-
formed a ministeral or a judicial duty. For this purpose at least the will has
been given a construction. When an executor sells property under a power of
sale in a will and makes a distribution and his final report is approved it matters
little to the devisee that in order to avoid a construction of a devise of reality,
equitable conversion is considered to have taken place and the devise was not a
devise at all but a legacy. What he is interested to know and what the law
ought to tell him is must he pay the tax and may he keep the money? When the
will is admitted to probate the order vests a free hold estate in the devisees
under the will. True it may be divested in a direct proceeding, or in any num-
ber of collateral proceedings, and at most any time thereafter, perhaps years
hence but in a certain limited sense the title has been established by the mere
fact of probate.
Our statute has changed the matter of probate from a proceeding in rem
to one in personam. Notice must be given to all who may by any chance ever
be interested in the will. The attorney who files the petition for probate must
construe the will in every case. No good reason appears why the court should
not, as a part of the administration determine all questions of construction so
as to give the distributees the interest contemplated by the will, without the
probability of further litigation. If a construction of the will is necessary to
determine a matter relating to administration, the circuit court will not, and the
probate court may not construe it. Present litigation provides no method for
the construction of a will which is not uncertain or ambiguous on its face and
involves only legal titles, but leaves the interest of the devisee to be questioned
in some indirect proceeding that may arise years afterward.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
REMEDIES
In view of the fact that the whole matter of wills is of statutory origin,
the remedy for the situation suggests itself. The right to contest a will is not
a vested one, nor is the right to appeal from orders of the county and probate
courts to the circuit court with a trial de novo. The legislature could abrogate
all the provisions of the statute involving will contests.
1. The county court should be given unlimited jurisdiction in all probate
matters as contemplated by the constitution.
2. The county court should be given concurrent jurisdiction with the
circuit court over testamentary trusts.
These further remedies are suggested as aids to the problems of construction:
3. The county court should be given concurrent jurisdiction with the
circuit court by a special enactment to correct mistakes in wills and given effect
to the established intent of the testator.
4. Appeals from the county courts should be allowed on all final orders
to the appellate or Supreme court and the provision for appeal and trial de novo
in the circuit court should be repealed.
5. Wigam's seven propositions should be given legislative sanction and
thus settle many evidence questions.
The Supreme Court has already implied that concurrent jurisdiction over
testamentary trusts may be conferred on county courts. The Constitution of 1870
provided that the legislature may provide for probate courts. A statute was re-
quired to effect the provision. An interesting question is presented whether the
legislature could repeal this act. All other remedies could be provided by statute.
Questions of construction could be raised on the pleadings in the county
court and the final settlement of the estate would be an adjudication of the title
the devisee held. The proceedure would be simpler and certain, and litigation
very much reduced.
